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This article examines the discursive practices that enable the construction of Turkish “exceptionalism.” It
argues that in an attempt to play the mediator/peacemaker role as an emerging power, the Turkish elite
construct an “exceptionalist” identity that portrays Turkey in a liminal state. This liminality and thus the
“exceptionalist” identity it creates, is rooted in the hybridization of Turkey’s geographical and historical
characteristics. The Turkish foreign policy elite make every effort to underscore Turkey’s geography as
a meeting place of different continents. Historically, there has also been an ongoing campaign to depict
Turkey’s past as “multicultural” and multi-civilizational. These constructions of identity however, run
counter to the Kemalist nation-building project, which is based on “purity” in contrast to “hybridity”
both in terms of historiography and practice.
 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.“It is impossible to separate Turkish foreign policy from Turkey’s
past. Napoleon once said that it is geography that dictated foreign
policy. I am going to add two more factors: history and the con-
juncture. Indeed for a country like Turkey that has liquidated an
empire, geography and history hold many advantages and disad-
vantages as well as many opportunities and challenges and
responsibilities” (Demirel, 2002b: pp. 683e684).
“What are the main factors that place Turkey on a different axis
and create a unique cultural dynamism? For these factors, one
should look intoTurkey’s two constant variables related to time and
space, into history and geography” (Davutoglu, 2004: pp. 80e81).
“Turkey is a modern Eurasian country that bridges the East and the
West and has successfully managed to synthesize the culture and
values of both equally. Our roots in Central Asia and interaction
with the Western world that dates back to centuries, grants us the
exceptional situation of fully belonging to both continents at the
same time” (Gül, 2008).
Howdo states create a sense of national “exceptionalism?” That is,
how do they generate the belief, which sometimes help justify states’nancially supported by The
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All rights reserved.actions and policies (Brummett, 2007: p. 302; Ricento, 2003: p. 613),
that they are a “special case ‘outside’ the common patterns and laws
of history” (Tyrrell, 1991: p. 1031)? Pointing out or implying that
a state and its features are “unique” and “exceptional” is one way of
creating such a belief. In addition to highlighting a “unique” geog-
raphy and history, elites can also construct “exceptionalism” through
a series of discursive practices. This paper analyzes and exposes the
complex web of discursive practices that shape the construction of
Turkish “exceptionalism” in the post-Cold War period. The main
argument is that Turkish exceptionalism in the post-ColdWar period
is constructed via liminal representations of the country. That is,
while its policymakers imagine Turkey as a mediator/peacemaker
between East and West, Turkey is also referred to as a country
transitioning from amiddle-sized power to a greater power. Turkey’s
liminality, or the state of “being neither here nor there” or “being
betwixt and between the positions,” to borrow the term from
anthropologist Turner (1969: p. 95), is grounded in the hybrid
representations of its geography and history. The hybridization of
geography is constructed by various discursive practices that portray
Turkey as ameeting place of different regions and continents. Turkey,
in other words, is portrayed as belonging to two different continents
and containing the features of both. The hybridization of history
means that Turkey’s past, especially its multiethnic and multireli-
gious Ottoman past is remembered and represented in a multicul-
turalway. In otherwords, Turkey’s history and geographyand thus its
liminal status are thereby presented as exceptional in world politics.
With this argument as its background, this paper has two goals.
The ﬁrst goal is to illustrate the long tradition of constructing
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through the post-Cold War period (the period under consideration
in this paper). With the “neo-Ottomanism” debate en vogue yet
again (“neo-Ottomanism” itself being a hybrid representation of
history), the media have continually pointed to Ahmet Davutoglu
and his book Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu
(Strategic Depth: Turkey’s International Position) published in 2001
as the source of this discourse. In that book Davutoglu argues that
Turkey’s two “strategic depths” are its history and geography and
that Turks should make the utmost use of these “depths” to turn
Turkey into a major power. Yet neither Davutoglu who is the
current Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, nor the “reformed
Islamist” Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development
Party-JDP) to which he belongs is the sole architect of the discourse
that portrays Turkey’s liminality. When the neo-Ottomanism
debate resurfaced in the 2000s, some scholars pointed to a “conti-
nuity” between the policies of Turgut Özal’s Anavatan Partisi
(Motherland Party-MP) and Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s JDP and espe-
cially, Ahmet Davutoglu’s “strategic depth,” doctrine (Murnison
2006: p. 947). Even so, Davutoglu, the JDP and former Prime
Minister Turgut Özal and are not the only actors who portrayed
Turkey liminally and banked on hybrid representations of geog-
raphy and history and thus, deliberately or not, created an excep-
tionalist identity for Turkey. If neo-Ottomanism is deﬁned as
a discourse that highlights Turkey’s Ottoman past andmixes it with
geographical uniqueness to justify an active foreign policy in
Turkey’s immediate neighborhood, it can easily be demonstrated
that there were shades of unspoken neo-Ottomanism helping to
construct an exceptionalist Turkish identity even during the
periods in which there was no neo-Ottomanism debate.
The second goal of this paper is to draw attention to the
incongruity, or paradox, that this understanding of Turkish excep-
tionalism, which is based on history and geography, creates. Critical
geopolitics is based on the premise that more than geographies,
there are geographical representations, that when invented and
interpreted, create tools of power in the service of statecraft
(O’Tuathail and Dalby 1998: p. 15). For Dijkink (1996), in contrast, it
is not only geographical but historical representations too are the
tools of power. Dijkink argues that national identity and geopolit-
ical visions (i.e., the way inwhich a country’s policymakers imagine
their country’s location remember their past and conduct their
foreign policy), are inseparable from the construction of a national
identity. Dijkink ﬁnds a reciprocal relationship between foreign
policymaking and the creation of national identity, neither of which
can exist without imaginations of location and past. With Turkish
exceptionalism, one can talk about two different and contradictory
sets of identities prevalent in present-day Turkey, one at the
domestic level and the other at the international level. One of these
identities is the exceptionalist identity based on the hybridization
of geography and history that attempts to portray Turkey as an
emerging power as well as a mediator/peacemaker thus posi-
tioning it liminally at the international level. The realities at the
domestic level are quite different. The ofﬁcial state identity set forth
by the Kemalist founders of the Turkish Republic, is based on the
“purity” principle (Ersanlı, 2002: p. 153). That is, Turkish nation
making was “puriﬁed” in several regards. First, the Ottoman and
Islamic past e the past that the Turkish elites have been trying to
reclaim since the 1950s and more forcefully since the 1980s e was
initially removed from Turkey’s historiography (Ersanlı, 2002).
Second, Kemalist nation-building was based on excluding and
expelling non-Muslim elements from society both rhetorically and
more importantly, at a practicals level (see for example, Aktar,
2009: pp. 29e62; Çagaptay, 2006: Chapter 6 and 7). It also stood
on the premise that all remaining Muslims were “Turks” or, espe-
cially in the case of the Kurds were potential “Turks” (Yegen, 2007).Third, as a result, even the ancient Anatolian civilizations have only
been selectively remembered in history books since the establish-
ment of the Republic (Copeaux, 2002: pp. 399e401). Put differ-
ently, as Çolak (2006: p. 599) and Yılmaz and Yosmaoglu (2008:
p. 677) have also argued, hybrid or the “multicultural” and
“multi-civilizational” representations of Turkey’s past and geog-
raphy that contain these elements, or the desire to remember these
elements contradict the founding premises of the Kemalist state
(which takes a purist stance in nation making) as well as the
current realities regarding the state of ethnic and religious
pluralism in contemporary Turkey.
The remainder of this paper unfolds in four sections. After this
introduction, I discuss key concepts, namely exceptionalism, limi-
nality and hybridity. I then analyze the historical background that
prepared the way for and perpetuated the emergence of the
geographical and historical hybridization that grounds the claims of
Turkish exceptionalism. In the third section, I discuss the repre-
sentational practices of geographical and historical hybridization
and ﬁnally summarize the paper in the conclusionwhere I reiterate
my main ﬁndings and arguments.1
Deﬁning exceptionalism, liminality and hybridity
Exceptionalism
The literature is replete with the analyses of different claims to
exceptionalism. Some analyses are critical, some favorable, andother
deconstructive. There is special attention paid to American excep-
tionalism, but there are also discussions of other claims to excep-
tionalism such as the Asian, Chinese, Canadian, and Israeli varieties,
just to cite a few. One can divide the exceptionalism literature in
political science and international relations into two parts. Some of
these studies focus on the cultural, religious, historical, strategic or
societal underpinnings of a state or a nation that serves as thebasis of
the claims of difference (Lipset, 1996) and ultimately for the
construction of claims of superiority vis-à-vis other states and
nations (Hodgson, 2009; Merom, 1999). Other studies focus on
certain institutional or procedural factors that defy generalizations
related to various laws, theories or expectations, or to put it more
concisely, on “anomalies” in the political science or international
relations literature (Kazemipur 2006; Mahajan 2005; Studlar 2001).
In the Turkish setting however, works explicitly discussing or
referring to Turkish exceptionalism are rare and mostly focus on
political or economic processes at the domestic level. While
Brummett (2007), in analyzing cartoons appearing in 19th century
Ottoman newspapers, deconstructs the emergence of Ottoman
exceptionalism as a resource to overcome accusations of inferiority,
Mardin (2005) talks about a TurkisheIslamic exceptionalism and
points to “the speciﬁcs of Turkish history . that have worked
cumulatively to create a special setting for Islam, a setting where
secularism and Islam interpenetrate” (2005: p. 148). For Angrist
(2004), it is the Turkish political system that is “exceptional,” as
Turkey is the only country with competitive party politics in the
post-Ottoman lands. Önis¸ and Güven (2010) recently have argued
that the fact that Turkey did not renew its agreement with
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) should be considered
“exceptional.” Michael (2008), in contrast, has linked the politici-
zation of every issue in Turkey to its “geographical and historical
exceptionalism.”
However, the construction of an “exceptional” national self-
image through the foreign policy process based on Turkey’s
geographical and historical features and the ways in which this
construction has been accomplished seems to have been missed by
students of Turkey. This is not to say that Turkey’s geographical and
historical features have not been elaborated on by others. Turkey’s
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these factors on Turkey’s polity and politics is an oft-repeated
theme in Turkish politics. While countless scholars over the
decades have argued that Turkey’s geography determines the
country’s foreign and security policies (Dominian 1916: p. 286;
Sander 2006: p. 79; Vali, 1971: p. 44; to cite a few), many others
have underscored the importance of the “Ottoman legacy” in
Turkish politics, especially in foreign and security policymaking
(Heper 2000; Jung 2003; Karaosmanoglu 2000; Walker, 2009 to
cite a few). In the same vein, Turkey has been described as a country
with “ambivalent ties to Europe” (Müftüler Baç, 2004: p. 31), as
well as an “in-between” (Robins, 1996: pp. 65e66), and a “hybrid”
(Diez, 2005: p. 633) place, which is “impossible to categorize”
(Müftüler Baç, 1998: p. 248). Though all these studies highlight
Turkey’s historical and/or geographical “uniqueness,” they take
these features as given. And while it might be true that Turkey’s
location is a bit out of the “ordinary,” to quote Tonra, “facts do not
speak for themselves, they are spoken for” (Tonra, 2006: p. 3). That
is, how elites imagine and discursively express those imaginings
shapes the construction and objectiﬁcation of reality.
Recently, however, more elaborate analyses have emerged
pointing to the unsettled nature of historical and geographical
features in the context of Turkish foreign policy discourse. While
Aydın (2003) highlighted the “securitization of history and geog-
raphy,” Tank (2006: p. 464) mentioned the “manipulation of history
and geography. for creating a unique image” and the JDP
government’s construction of a “go-between” identity via foreign
policy. Bilgin (2009) has also highlighted Turkey’s recent claim for
“interstitiality and cosmopolitanism” (Bilgin, 2009: p. 121). All
these studies are immensely informative, but though they imply the
“constructedness” of the above-mentioned features, they do not
analyze the ways in which this construction takes place. This paper
illustrate how historical and geographical features of a country are
used discursively to construct an exceptional identity that in turn
justiﬁes and rationalize foreign policy actions.
Liminality and hybridity
The term liminality originated in the work of anthropologist
Arnold Van Gennep who explored rites of passage rituals in various
societies. In The Rites of Passage, Van Gennep (1908) used the term
liminality to describe the transitory period between two stages of
human life. Building on Van Gennep’s work, Victor Turner, another
anthropologist, elaborated on the functions and attributes of limi-
nality. According to Turner, society was a series of “structure of
positions” and “the period of margin or ‘liminality’ was an inter-
structural situation” (Turner, 1967: p. 93). In his The Ritual Process:
Structure and Anti-Structure, Turner (1969) gave a clearer deﬁnition
of liminality, arguing that “liminal entities are neither here nor
there, they are betwixt and between the positions assigned and
arranged by law, custom, convention and ceremonial” (1969: p. 95).
According to Turner, liminality had its own pros and cons.
Liminals were “inferior, submissive and silent” (1969: pp.
100e103), and liminality led to “ambiguity, paradox and confusion”
(1967: pp. 96e97). Yet liminality also provided the ritual subject
with the opportunity of being “neither this nor that and yet.both”
(1967: p. 99) as well as the chance to be in a “stage of reﬂection”
(1967: p. 105) allowing a “certain freedom to juggle with the factors
of existence” (1967: p. 106). In his later writings, Turner distin-
guished liminality from marginality, arguing that in contrast to
liminals, which are transitioning from one stage to another,
marginals “have no cultural assurance of a ﬁnal stable resolution of
their ambiguity” (1974: p. 233). In other words, while being
a liminal was not something fully desirable in Turner’s conception,
comparatively speaking it was better than being a marginal.The terms “liminality” and “marginality” only recently have
been applied to international relations. The timing of their emer-
gence is not a coincidence. Much of the recent literature has
devoted attention to Europe’s identity formation and “othering”
practices and to the ability of the European “self” to shape the
“other” (Diez, 2004, 2005; Neumann 1996, 1998). Yet this interac-
tion between self and other has not always been that clear because
the difference between self and other occasionally has produced
forms other than the “other,” i.e. liminality (Rumelili 2004:
pp. 27e38).
Both liminality and marginality have been applied to countries
that have unclear ties to various economic or political communities,
or to countries that are in the process of becoming a part of such
communities. In this regard, Australia (Higgot and Nossal 1997;
Rumelili 2007: Chapter 6), Turkey (Rumelili 2003, 2004, 2007)
and Estonia (Malksoo, 2009) have been referred to as liminals in the
recent international relations literature. Rumelili (2003) has argued
that the European Union’s (EU) representation of Turkey as liminal
has intensiﬁed Turkey’s conﬂict with its neighbor Greece. Further
theorizing on the community-building practices of the EU, Rumelili
argued that Turkish elites actively countered the EU’s efforts to
portray Turkey as a liminal by presenting Turkey as a country in
possession of a dual Eastern and Western, or European and Asian,
identity, especially after Turkey was not included among the list of
candidate countries at the Luxembourg Summit in 1997 (2007:
Chapter 4). For Rumelili, it was the EU that pushed Turkey into
a liminal position and it was Turkey that started “negotiating this
liminality” (2007: pp. 82e97).
Parker (2008) drawing on examples from countries as diverse as
Denmark and Russia and Turkey and Britain, do not use the terms
liminal or liminality per se, yet call for a theory of “positive mar-
ginality” and argue that countries considered “marginals” or in the
“margins” are in reality neither, meaning that such countries have
the power and the ability to shape the foreign relations of and with
“center” countries (Parker, 2008). With this “theory of positive
marginality” in the background, Tassinari (2008) deﬁned Turkey as
a “peculiarly marginal” country, as it is not fully “marginal,” i.e., not
a full EU member, but part of the Customs Union, partly within the
EU’s power structure, and partly modern. Tassinari argued that
Turkey was trying to mitigate this “marginality” by asking for
“intermediation rewards” (p. 215) or by declaring itself an “alter-
native center” (p. 219).
Though both Rumelili and Tassinari put a ﬁnger on Turkey’s out-
of-the-ordinary, even outcast status, they miss the point that
Turkey’s liminality, or its “in-between” status, is neither created by
the EU alone nor regarded by the Turks as a bad thing. Rather, to
make the claim for being Tassinari’s “alternative center,” and to
receive “the intermediation rewards,” Turkey’s elites speciﬁcally
imagine Turkey in a liminal position, support their claim with
hybrid representations of the spatial and temporal features of
Turkey and spend the utmost effort to portray their country as such
and carry liminality as a badge of honor. These actions, in turn,
reinforce Turkey’s liminal status. After all, as Turner put it, limi-
nality is a much-preferred status compared to marginality, and the
“liminality of the strong is weakness, of the weak is strength”
(Turner, 1969: p. 200).
Liminality, while potentially destabilizing, can be full of oppor-
tunities since the ritual subject exists in a state of being “neither
this nor that and yet.both” (Turner, 1967: p. 99). The idea of “being
both” is a major theme in post-colonial literature, where hybridity
is considered a strategy of the colonized (i.e., the weak) to resist the
colonizer (i.e., the strong) (Bhabha, 1996: pp. 53e60). Bhabha has
argued that the “in-between spaces provide the terrain for elabo-
rating strategies of selfhooddsingular or communaldthat initiate
new signs of identity, and innovative sites of collaboration and
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interstitial passage between ﬁxed identiﬁcations opens up the
possibility of cultural hybridity that entertains difference without
an assumed or imposed hierarchy” (Bhabha, 1994: p. 4). In other
words, hybridity is a strategy of resistance that can only take place
in a liminal space. Though neither Turkey nor its precursor
Ottoman Empire was ever colonized, both entities historically have
had an uneasy relationship with the “West” and displayed the
reﬂexes of a post-colonial country (Keyman, 1995: p. 96). Liminal
representations grounded in hybrid constructions of geography and
history not only paves the way for “exceptionalism.” Such repre-
sentations also turn exceptionalism into a strategy of resistance and
paradoxically, a claim of superiority against the “West” as part of
the quest to become part of the West.
The background
Since the ﬁnal century of the Ottoman Empire’s existence,
foreign policymaking in Turkey has turned into a deliberate effort
to shape Turkish identity. The founders of the Republic thought that
a Western-oriented foreign policy would be an important factor in
guaranteeing a “Western” component of a modern Turkish identity
(Bilgin, 2009). When, after the end of World War II, Turkey was
incorporated into the West through various institutions, especially
within such collective security organizations as the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO), the missing “Western” component of
Turkish identity that the Turkish elites had long desired was
obtained (Aybet & Müftüler Baç 2000; Müftüler Baç, 2000a: p. 22;
Yılmaz & Bilgin, 2005e2006).
In the 1980s, this cozy arrangement, which provided the
“Westerness” of Turkey throughout the Cold War years came to an
end. Turkey’s 1980 military coup, which highlighted democratic
deﬁciencies in Turkey, led to the downgrading of Turkey’s ties with
the Council of Europe and to the suspension of parts of the Asso-
ciation Agreement between Turkey and the European Economic
Community (EEC), the predecessor of the EU (Dagı, 1996: p. 134;
Müftüler Baç, 2000b: p. 165). Although the United States (US) was
quite supportive of the 1980 military coup and the military
government that emerged in its aftermath (Ludington & Spain,
1983: pp. 150e168), Turkey’s “Western” credentials were tar-
nished, with various European institutions distancing themselves
from Turkey.
Since it found itself not fully desired by Europe, Turkey focused
attention on the Islamic countries in the greater Middle East area
(Dagı, 1996: p. 136). Obviously, this was not the ﬁrst time that
Turkey “had turned to East,” so to speak. In themid-1950s, and then
again in the 1960s, Turkish politicians had placed the Middle East
on their maps at different times, in order to “diversify” Turkish
foreign policy (Benli Altunıs¸ık and Tür 2005: p. 108; Mango 1968).
Yet in the aftermath of the 1980 military coup, the favoring of
Islamic andMiddle Eastern countries grew to such an extent that in
1984, for the ﬁrst time since the inception of the Organization of the
Islamic Conference (OIC), Turkey was represented at the OIC’s
annual meeting at the presidential level e by Kenan Evren the
military coup leader turned president (Aykan, 1993: p. 102). The
junta government’s “eastward-looking” Turkish foreign policy was
perpetuated by Turgut Özal, who became the head of the ﬁrst
civilian government after the coup (Sayarı, 1990: pp. 395e401).
However, more importantly, it was against this Middle Eastern
backdrop that Turkey tried to prove its use to the West to regain its
“Western” credentials. While to Europe and for European audiences
Turkey maintained the rhetoric that Turkey was a European
country; it began to employ a liminality discourse with Middle
Eastern countries, pointing to the fact that Turkey could play the
middleman between the Middle East and Europe, and the MiddleEast and the West in general (Yanık, 2009b: pp. 10e12). On a more
practical level, however, Turkey (or, to be more precise, Özal, who
by then had become the president of the country) pushed for
involvement in the Gulf War of 1990e1991, again trying to please
its Western allies as well to polish Turkey’s Western credentials
(Hale, 1992: pp. 679e692).
After the transition to civilian rule, Turkey normalized ties with
the Council of Europe and the Association Agreement was reini-
tiated in 1988. But these moves, for several reasons, were not
enough to secure the niche that Turkey had occupied during the
post-World War II years. First of all, problems with Turkey’s human
rights record and democracy persisted, which meant Turkey’s
regime was not on par with the European countries. The second
blow to Turkey’s Europeanness/Westerness came when the Euro-
pean Community (EC) rejected Turkey’s membership application in
1989, telling Turkey it would not be part of that exclusive club in the
foreseeable future. Finally, Turkey’s strategy of maintaining its
European/Western credentials through membership in trans-
atlantic security establishments fell apart when the Soviet “enemy”
disappeared in 1991, leading to more questioning of Turkey’s role in
the various security and non-security institutions of the “West,”
and thus of Turkey’s place within and its identity as part of the
“West” (Müftüler Baç 1998: p. 243). Yet these occasions, which
brought Turkey’s Europeanness/Westerness was under scrutiny
also provided Turkish foreign policymakers with the opportunity to
pursue “alternatives” to Europe. Özal’s activism, combined with
that of Süleyman Demirel’s, reached a new level with the collapse
of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the Turkic republics, as
Turkey now not only had to redeﬁne its role with regard to Europe
and the West, but also had to justify rhetorically its activist policy
toward these Turkic states.Constructing hybrid representational practices
Metaphors and “multiculturalism”
Referring to Turkey’s “unique” history and geography is one way
of creating a claim to exceptionalism. But metaphors also come in
handy while constructing exceptionalism because as linguistic
instruments they play a crucial role in shaping reality (or more
correctly, what people believe is real, as they generate “new
meanings” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980: pp. 156, 211)). Though today
“bridge” has become the metaphor describing contemporary
Turkey, the Turkish political elite used “door,” “latch and key,”
“crossroads,” and “gate” to describe not only Turkey’s hybrid loca-
tion and past, but also the role or the function to which it aspired
internationally (Yanık 2009a: pp. 536e537). Be it a bridge, door,
gate, crossroads or a latch-key, thesemetaphors denote or highlight
Turkey’s middleman/broker function and imply that Turkey’s
territory sits in a zone of transition, where different continents and
pasts mix, match and overlap. With these metaphors Turkey was
portrayed as a merchant who would proﬁt from the riches of the
Middle East, as a facilitator for the newly independent states in
Eurasia, and as a peacemaker in the Balkans and the Middle East.
For example, before the “bridge” metaphor came to dominate the
discourse, Süleyman Demirel, the prime minister at the time,
argued that “in this part of the world, Turkey has an exceptional
importance of being a gate from East toWest and fromWest to East
(Demirel, 1992: p. 33). In 1992, Özal described Turkey in these
terms:
Our country is locatedbetweendevelopedWestern countries and
Islamic countries that have rich oil resources. Our location has
advantages and certain difﬁculties. Like a bridge that connects
two people, wemust connect these two cultures differing in their
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conﬂict within us. In other words, we should synthesize West’s
science and technology andMiddle East’s belief and value system
and present it for the use of humanity. Turkey that can construct
a bridge in this regardwill do great service for regional andworld
peace (Özal, 1992a: p. 25).
What is interesting in Turkey’s case is that the bridge metaphor,
which has become the dominant metaphor, is based on the visual
representations of the two bridges that connect the two continents
of Asia and Europe as well as the two sides of Istanbul. While visual
and discursive representations of a bridge connecting two conti-
nents provide the basis for geographical hybridization, the histor-
ical hybridization, in contrast, rests on representations of Istanbul
as “cosmopolitan” and “multicultural,” especially through refer-
ences to its Ottoman past.
The claim to the Ottoman past is regarded as a matter of
competition between different groups trying to shape Turkish
identity (Çolak, 2006; Fisher Onar, 2009; Walker, 2009; Yavuz,
1998). Istanbul, in this context, plays an important role as Islamist
parties and conservative groups in Turkey have used Istanbul as
a tool to reframe their own Ottoman-Islamist version of history,
challenging Turkey’s ofﬁcial history at the domestic level (Çınar,
2001; Öncü, 2007). These groups imagine and try to portray
Istanbul under Ottoman hegemony as the epitome of “multicul-
turalism” and “peaceful coexistence” and thus as an illustration of
Ottoman justice (Bora, 1999: p. 49; Öncü, 2007: p. 241). In other
words, Istanbul with its presumed “multicultural” past, became
amicrocosm of “pax-Ottomana” (Çetinsaya, 2003: p. 371) as well as
a case of the hybridization of history.The “neo-Ottomanism” debate
This yearning for a hybrid past took place at the international
level as well. The term “neo-Ottomanism” ﬁrst became fashionable
in academic and non-academic discourse in the early 1990s and
then again in the 2000s, especially after the advance of the JDP to
power. In the ﬁrst wave, Turgut Özal was credited as the architect of
neo-Ottomanism in Turkish foreign policy, while Ahmet Davutoglu,
an academic turned minister of foreign affairs, was considered the
architect of the second wave. Though the term became en vogue
after the end of the Cold War, David Barchard in Turkey and the
West, (published in 1985) uses it to describe Turkey’s turn toMiddle
East (Barchard 1985: p. 91). Graham Fuller of Rand Corporation, one
of the early proponents of the idea in academia, deﬁned neo-
Ottomanism in 1992 as “a renewed interest in the former territories
and people of the Empire, which includes Muslims who were part
of that Empire,” that arose due to the disappearance of Cold War
conditions and that helped Turks “to see themselves once again at
the center of a world reemerging around them on all sides rather
than at the tail-end of a Europeanworld” (Fuller, 1992: p. 13). While
other Rand Corporation publications (see for example Fuller, Lesser,
Henze, & Brown, 1993) stressed this idea on the international
academic/think tank scene, in Turkey Cengiz Çandar, a journalist
and adviser to Turgut Özal is usually credited with coining the term
neo-Ottomanism and acting as an early proponent of a foreign
policy based on the concept (Çetinsaya, 2003: p. 378; Çolak, 2006:
p. 592). Not surprisingly, Çandar and Fuller eventually penned an
article together in 2001, titled “Grand Geopolitics for a New
Turkey,” full of references praising the Ottoman Empire and
underscoring how Turkey should make use of this imperial gran-
deur (Çandar & Fuller, 2001).
Yet in both instances when the term neo-Ottomanism became
common currency in the media and academia, Turkish leaders
themselves never used the term. Indeed, afraid of sounding tooimperialistic, policymakers strongly rejected the neo-Ottoman
label alongwith claims of “expansionism” (Demirel 2002b: pp. 685;
Haber10, 2010). Turkish elites’ rejection of neo-Ottomanism as
a term, however, did not mean that Turkish leaders discontinued
references to Turkey’s liminal state and hybrid geography and
history. The Özal years were a milestone in the way Turkish history
was hybridized to shape Turkish exceptionalism, as Turkish elites
revised “multiethnic” and “multireligious” to mean “multicultural.”
This claim to multiculturalism rested on a much-romanticized
version of the Ottomanmillet system (which itself is a controversial
subject) (Braude, 1982) as well as on an equally controversial pax-
Ottomana argument (Forbes, Toynbee, Mitrany, & Hogarth 1915: p.
47; Todorova, 2000), which assumes that the Ottoman Empire
brought peace and stability to the lands that it conquered.
However, through a “selective reading” (Yavuz, 1998: p. 24) of
Ottoman history, Özal and later various other politician preferred to
equate the presence and the governance of various different ethnic
groups in the Ottoman Empire with the ideas of “pluralism” and
“harmony” and thus with “multiculturalism,” the ability to
“govern” these groups as “good governance,” and “stability” and
“order” as “peace.” These selective readings were then translated
into a rhetoric implying that the qualiﬁcations of the Ottoman
Empire as a “peacemaker” bestowed contemporary Turkeywith the
credentials to provide peace and stability domestically and
regionally. Özal and Turkish politicians who followed him tried to
construct the convoluted argument that since the Ottoman millet
system worked for the Ottoman Empire in the past, Turkey, as the
present-day heir of that Empire, also automatically inherited the
practice of Muslim groups of different ethnicities to live together.
This hybridized image of the past that contained a romanticized
picture of coexistence, had a dual use. First, it targeted Kurds, or
more precisely it targeted the Kurdish separatism in Turkey that
ﬂared up in the early 1980s. Now that non-Muslims in Turkey were
reduced to almost insigniﬁcant numbers, Islam was neatly extrac-
ted from this hybrid romanticized “multicultural” past to provide
an overarching identity that served as an antidote to rising Kurdish
separatism (Çetinsaya 2003: p. 379; Çolak, 2006: p. 598). Second,
on an international scale because states adjacent to Turkey were
once part of the Ottoman Empire, Turkish elites viewed them as
part of the romanticized Ottoman coexistence experience. This line
of thinking enabled Turkish foreign policymakers, as the heirs of
the Ottoman Empire, to claim to hold ﬁrst hand experience in
coexistence and consequently to claim for Turkey, ﬁrst in the Bal-
kans and then in some of the Turkic republics of the former Soviet
Union, the role of a regional leader capable of providing stability,
economic development and peace (Tulander 1995; Yavuz 1998: p.
40). Because Turkic communities were part of the ﬁrst wave of neo-
Ottomanism (and despite Turkish elites’ rejection of the term),
some observers argued that not only was Turkey reviving the
Ottoman Empire (Constantinides, 1996; Waever, 1996), it also,
because its foreign policy extended geographically beyond the
former Ottoman lands into the Turkic speaking countries of the
former Soviet Union, was reviving the pan-Turkist ideals of the ﬁnal
years of the Ottoman Empire (Landau, 1995: p. 221).
In its 1992 summer issue, the journal Türkiye Günlügü (The Diary
of Turkey) published an interviewwith Turgut Özal, the president of
Turkey at the time, titled “Türkiye’nin Önünde Hacet Kapıları
Açıldı,” (a title which can be translated roughly as “Turkey’s Wishes
are Granted”), which is considered the ofﬁcial proclamation of neo-
Ottomanism (Çolak, 2006: p. 592). In that interview Özal, without
pronouncing the word neo-Ottomanism, talks about the ways in
which Turkey had inherited the governing practices of the Ottoman
Empire as well as an “exceptional” geography. The combination of
the two Özal argued, could become the solution to regional insta-
bility and resolve Turkey’s Kurdish “problem.” According to Özal,
L.K. Yanık / Political Geography 30 (2011) 80e89 85We need to identify and properly analyze several points
regarding the geopolitical region that extends from Central Asia
to the Balkans, which forms the target area of our leadership
role. To a large degree, this region contains Turkish communities
[sic] and with this aspect, at the same time, it also harbors the
cultural belt that we call Turkish World [sic]. Yet, this region,
again to a large extent, contains communities and states that are
Muslim but not Turkish, which lived as Ottoman subjects. So, in
this region that extends from the Adriatic to Central Asia, we can
talk about several different nestled rings that have features in
common but are located separate from each other. We should
see these rings as areas with large intersection points (Özal
1992b: p. 14).
In the same interview, Özal compared and contrasted the
multiethnic and multireligious Ottoman Empire with multiethnic
Yugoslavia, claiming that separatism in Yugoslavia in the 1990s was
a result of a “nonconsensual union” of different ethnic groups. By
labeling Yugoslavia as a “nonconsensual union” and contrasting it
with the Ottoman Empire e as if the Ottoman Empire did not also
dissolve at the end of the World War I e Özal placed the Ottoman
Empire in a separate category:
When it comes to Turkey the situation is very different. Maybe it
is the impact of religion, or the effect of Islam that made [us]
mingle with each other and maintain a consensual union for
centuries. As a country and a society descending from an
Empire, we were able to maintain a cultural and a political
identity that transcends ethnic differences. Just like in the days
of the Empire, I believe that Islam is the most important factor
forming that identity (Özal, 1992b: p. 17).
To summarize, references to the Ottoman Empire or claims to be
the heir of the Ottoman Empire helped the Turkish elite to achieve
two goals simultaneously. At the domestic level, the multiethnic
nature of the Ottoman Empire was mobilized to help “solve”
Turkey’s Kurdish “problem”; internationally, the fact that Turkey’s
present-day neighbors were once part of the Ottoman Empire
helped construct the argument that Turkey can establish order,
stability and peace in the surrounding region. Though neither Özal
nor his successors ever pronounced the word neo-Ottomanism, the
idea of neo-Ottomanism was a hybridization of history, par excel-
lence, mixed with some low doses of geographical hybridization.From Eurasia to multi-civilizational Turkey
As the Soviet Union was dissolving, the emergence of the Turkic
Republics in the post-Soviet space prompted the Turkish foreign
policy elite to “discover Eurasia” (Yanık 2009a: p. 537). The desire of
Turkish foreign policymakers to associate Turkey with these
republics as part of an attempt to make Turkey into a regional
power, led them to place Turkey in the “center” or “hub” of Eurasia.
This depiction sustained the discourse that located Turkey where
Europe and Asia mixed and met, and consequently highlighted
Turkey’s geographical hybridity yet again.
Demirel described the post-Cold War situation in the region in
the following fashion: “new Turkish states have emerged onto the
world scene. That is, sibling countries’ ﬂags are standing next to
Turkey’s star and crescent ﬂag. This is something only two years
old, something that belongs to Eurasia. Eurasia is a geographical
name, but in reality, it is an event that belongs to Turkish [sic]
community (Demirel, 2002a: p. 218). Meanwhile, as the Soviet
Union collapsed and Turkey simultaneously sought admittance to
the EU, Turkish leaders did not see any problems in declaring
Turkey a “Eurasian power” along with Russia in one of the early
agreements signed with the latter (Tellal, 2005: pp. 546e547). Theidea of Eurasia did not remain at the state level, as the disappear-
ance of the Soviet threat and the emergence of “Eurasia” prepared
the ground for certain nationalist circles in Turkey. These nation-
alists following in the footsteps of their Russian counterparts,
offered Eurasianism as a foreign policy alternative, prescribing that
Turkey minimize relations with the EU (which, after all these years,
was still reluctant to accept Turkey as a member) and develop and
intensify ties at different levels with countries to Turkey’s east
(Akçalı and Perinçek 2009; Bilgin 2007: p. 753).
The “discovery” of Eurasia went hand-in-hand with the claim of
“Eurasianization,” which underscored Turkish nation’s “hybrid”
character. The following quote from Bülent Ecevit exempliﬁes ﬁrst,
how the Turkish elite in the 2000s, were willing to highlight the
continuity between the Ottoman Empire and present-day Turkey,
and second, how positively Turkish elites remembered the multi-
ethnic/multireligious character of the Ottoman Empire. Finally, the
quote points out how inseparable are historical and geographical
hybridity. One can regard Eurasianism and the selective remem-
bering of the “multiethnic/multireligious” nature of the Ottoman
Empire as two sides of the same coin and as parts of the same
hybridization process. While neo-Ottomanism represented the
historical hybridization phase of this process, the call for Eurasia or
Eurasianization represented the geographical phase.
For 600 years Turks have been Europe’s most effective element.
Some parts of Europe have been subject to Ottoman-Turkish
hegemony for centuries. Those societies that lived under the
Ottoman rulehavemaintained their religions, sects and languages
without any pressure being exerted on them. During the Repub-
lican era, on the other hand, the changes that were made in its
political, social and cultural character have helped us in depth in
terms of institutional integration with Europe.. Yet the Turkish
nation is not only European; at the same time, it is Central Asian,
Middle Eastern, Caucasian; it is from the Black Sea, from the
Eastern Mediterranean. The mixed identity of the Turkish nation
is not a defect but an asset for Europe. This special mixed identity
of the Turkish nation has gained a special importance, especially
when Europe and Asia are integrating during the process of Eur-
asianization. Turkey has become the key country that impacts the
whole world and civilization [sic] (Ecevit, 2000: p. 147).The process of “Eurasianization” also involved claims to being
a multi-civilizational country, claims that were frequently made by
Turkish politicians in the post-Cold War period. For example, Tur-
gut Özal, with Gündüz Aktan as his ghost writer, published Turkey
in Europe and Europe in Turkey, in which he argued, very much in
line with the Turkish History Thesis, argued that the roots of
Western countries go back to the ancient civilizations that once
lived in Anatolia. Therefore, Özal’s argument went, Turkey was
entitled to be considered part of the West (Özal, 1991). Similarly,
Tansu Çiller, ﬁrst as prime minister and then as minister of foreign
affairs, claimed that Turkey was a country that “synthesized”
different empires and civilizations. In a speech to the European
Media Union, Çiller described Turkey as a country
of tolerance and understanding as well as a refuge for those
ﬂeeing from persecution. This is where the continents meet and
it historically has been the meeting point for civilizations. Today
Turkey looks like a mosaic. We are proud to be the heir to
Roman, Greek, Ottoman and other cultures. All these past civi-
lizations have enriched our cultural understanding. The bridge
over Istanbul [sic] does not only connect Asia and Europe
physically, but also literally (Çiller 1993: p. 362).
_Ismail Cem, too, became one of the most important proponents
of this civilizational discourse. As minister of culture and then
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a “geography of civilizations” (Cem, 2004: pp. 33e34) and
reclaimed the Ottoman heritage in a positive manner and
denounced “Turkey” (but without getting too speciﬁc as to who in
Turkey) for forgetting the Ottoman Empire. In his 2004 book
Türkiye, Avrupa, Avrasya (Turkey, Europe, Eurasia), Cem argued that,
as minister of foreign affairs, he tried to overcome a “traditional”
foreign policy that disregarded “geography” and especially
“history,” and which “overlooked centuries of accumulation of
civilizational factors, relations and living experience” (Cem, 2004:
pp. 11e13). Cem further criticized “traditional Turkish foreign
policy” for unnaturally imposing an “either East or West” or
“Europe or Asia” dichotomy on Turkey, rather than looking for ways
of forming a “synthesis” and a “reconciliation” between “East and
West,” and “Europe and Asia,” respectively (Cem, 2004: p. 30). By
claiming that Turkey was “European thus Western and at the same
time Asian and thus Eastern” (Cem, 2004: p. 43) and by devoting
a section to “Ottoman tolerance” in this book, he deﬁned his
approach to foreign policy:
This approach aims to reconcile all civilizations that existed in
our geography and history with each other and also with
present-day Turkey. We can summarize Turkey’s Ottoman past,
which is symbolized by tolerance and the secular Turkish
Revolution as follows: in order to reﬂect a culture free from all
complexes on to our domestic and foreign policy, we need to
reconcile all civilizations with each other, with the past, with
today and tomorrow, and internalized by us. The starting point
of this approach is tolerance (Cem, 2004: p. 33).
Cem strove to reconcile East andWest throughout the post-Cold
War period. However, it was only after the 9/11 attacks that Cem
had the opportunity better to showcase Turkey’s “reconciler” role
as a “multi-civilizational country.” Turkey, as a candidate for EU
membership and a member of the OIC, hosted in February 2002
“The Meeting of Civilizations,” a forum for EU members and
candidate countries and OIC members. With the 9/11 attacks
setting Christianity and Islam at loggerheads, Turkey had a chance
to display its “exceptional” identity rooted in a mix of civilizations
by hosting a “multi-civilizational” conference.
“Neo-Ottomanism” redux
In 2004, two years after the JDP’s rise to power, “The Meeting of
Civilizations” was renamed the “Alliance of Civilizations.” After
organizing several conferences, Prime Minister Erdogan declared
that the “Alliance of Civilizations,” now co-chaired by Spain and
sponsored by the United Nations (UN), was “a candidate for
becoming the 21st century’s peace project” (Today’s Zaman, 2008).
In reality, the “Alliance of Civilizations” ended up introducing
a religious twist toTurkish exceptionalism because in this “alliance”
Turkey claimed to “bridge Islam and the West,” thus stepping
forward as a representative of Islam (Yanık 2009a: p. 542). In other
words, while the JDP maintained the civilizational discourse that
emerged in Turkey in the early 1990s, JDP’s understanding of civi-
lization was a more religious in tone, unlike its predecessor
governments whose understanding of civilization was more
cultural and historical, and less religiously deﬁned.
This discursive turn did not mean that other hybridization
practices such as seeing Turkey as “both European and Asian,” or in
the “core of Europe and Asia” or emphasizing Turkey’s special or
unique geography and history through metaphors were dis-
continued. Nor was the idea discarded of reaching out to Kurds on
the grounds that both Kurds and Turks shared a common history.
As recently as 2010, President Abdullah Gül, (a former minister
of foreign affairs), speaking in Diyarbakır e a city that isoverwhelmingly Kurdish e stated that “we are a large nation with
a deep past, that has lived together for years, sharing a common
culture, common sociological realities and a common history, and
more importantly, a ‘common empire.’ This nation will carry these
common feelings, this coexistence forward, [because] we are
a continuation of a big empire” (Gül 2010).
Overall the former representational practices continued, though
the media preferred to emphasize Turkey’s role as a peacemaker
mostly in the Middle East (and to lesser extent in the Caucasus and
elsewhere), based on Turkey’s “exceptional” geography and history.
This caused Turkish foreign policy to be labeled neo-Ottoman for
the second time in less than 20 years. Erdogan’s quote belowmakes
the Turkish elite’s aspirations and imaginations very clear.
Our records of peaceful solution of the problems and of termi-
nating conﬂict sources that threat international peace will be
useful in providing common goods such as establishment of
peace and stability in Balkans, Caucasses [sic] and large Middle
East regions. Turkey has a great potential to make a bridge
between Europe and Middle East and Far East. Let me compre-
hend [sic] the situation as a bridge between civilizations and
cultures not as a bridge geographically. Turkey is an example
country, which can undertake the duty of a bridge either at the
Middle East or at the Far East points (Erdogan 2005).
This shift, promulgated by the JDP as well as by the second wave
of neo-Ottomanism is attributed to Ahmet Davutoglu, who, after
a career in academia, and stint as an ambassador-at-large, was
appointed as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in May 2009. In his
book Strategic Depth (which has run through close to 40 printings),
Turkey is envisioned as a future great power that ﬁrst must assume
a mediator/peacemaker’s role, using its “exceptional” geography
and history. “The current struggle,” as Davutoglu has neatly
summarized his position “is not a war of liberation, but is to turn
Turkey into one of the largest powers in the world” (Milliyet, 2009).
While Davutoglu’s “strategic depth” doctrine is ﬂeshed out in his
book of the same name, one can also see its underlying arguments
in a series of interviews that Davutoglu gave after the 9/11 attacks.
During these interviews, Davutoglu is very critical of Samuel
Huntington and Francis Fukuyama’s theses that have shaped the
post-Cold War world order. While Davutoglu criticizes Huntington
for labeling Turkey as a “torn country,” which Davutoglu thinks is
something that should be perceived as positive not negative
(Davutoglu 2002: p.193). Similarly, Fukuyama is criticized for being
Western-centric and prematurely declaring “the end of history”
(Davutoglu 2002: p. 8). At these interviews Davutoglu’s criticism
about the West and Western scholarship are taken to another level
when he argues that the current state of crisis is a “crisis of not of
Islamic Civilization, but a crisis of Western Civilization” (Davutoglu
2002: p. 97) because “as Western Civilization globalized,” Davu-
toglu argues, “it started to curtail the historical areas of other
civilizations” (Davutoglu 2002: p. 91). While the “Chinese and
Indian civilizations could never become global,” the Ottoman
Empire, according to Davutoglu, “was able to globalize in a limited
sense,” which created a different heritage and thus opportunities
for present-day Turkey (Davutoglu, 2002: p. 196).
In terms of “multiculturalism,” Davutoglu states that “cities like
Paris, London and Berlin have just started to contain different
cultures in the past thirty years; a phenomenonwhich the Ottoman
Empire has lived through, is only now being experienced by the
West” (Davutoglu 2002: p. 112). By comparing the Ottoman
“expansion” into Europe, the Middle East and Africa to “globaliza-
tion,” Davutoglu tries to eliminate one of the most controversial
topics in the historiography of the Ottoman Empire: whether the
Ottoman conquests meant colonialism and/or imperialism. Overall,
with Ottoman conquests being equated to “Ottoman globalization”
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multiculturalism, Davutoglu indirectly refers to pax-Ottomana as
well as to an infallible Ottoman Empire.
While other members of the JDP insist on highlighting Turkey’s
bridge role Davutoglu seems undecided. In Strategic Depth, he
divides “bridge countries” into two: “those whose bridge role is
built on a strong identity and self-conﬁdence and those without
any self-conﬁdence that realize this bridge role in a pragmatic way.”
Accordingly, while those “without any self-conﬁdence” experience
identity crises, those with “self-conﬁdence,” such as the Ottoman
Empire “under the Islamic paradigm”. [and]. “located in one of
the most heterogeneous regions of civilizational history accept this
plurality as a source of richness” and thus create an exceptional
order (Davutoglu 2004: p. 92). In a 2008 interview, Davutoglu
argues that Turkey “should be seen neither as a bridge country,
which only connects two points, nor a frontier country, nor indeed
as an ordinary country, that sits at the edge of the Muslimworld or
theWest,” but rather as a “central” country (Davutoglu 2008: p. 78),
and so again he describes Turkey’s location and role with a meta-
phor. Overall, the hybridization or the exceptional identity that is
being produced by Turkey’s JDP government is more Islam and
Ottoman Empire-heavy than previous versions, with continued
emphasis on the romanticized multicultural coexistence model. Yet
what Davutoglu and the members of the JDP miss is that by criti-
cizing “Western Civilization” and upholding an Islam-dominant
Ottoman Empire in their discourse, they too become as “essen-
tialist” as their “Western” counterparts whom they criticize (Bilgin,
2009: p. 59e60).
Conclusion
This article examines the practices within Turkish foreign policy
discourse that have helped construct Turkish exceptionalism. Its
main argument is that Turkish elites’ hybrid representations of
Turkey’s history and geography empower them not only to claim
a peacemaker/mediator role for their country but also to portray
Turkey as a rising power with a liminal status and thus to present
Turkey as exceptional in the realm of international relations.
Turkish exceptionalism is constituted in several ways. First,
various metaphors were used that highlighted Turkey’s location as
a meeting place of different continents. In the early 1990s, different
metaphors such as door, gate, latch and key, and crossroad were
utilized, and ﬁnally the “bridge” metaphor was embraced by the
Turkish foreign policy elite. Second, the hybridization of geography
was also maintained through geographical constructs that denoted
a combination of two continents such as frequent references to
Eurasia as well as to “Eurasianization.” Third, history was hybrid-
ized when Turkish elites claimed that their present-day mediator
role was derived from the Ottoman Empire. The millet system and
the presence of multiethnic and multireligious groups in the
Ottoman Empire were portrayed by the Turkish elite as a signs of
“good governance” and evidence for the Ottoman Empire’s ability
to establish “peace and order.” This selective remembrance of
history was labeled as neo-Ottomanism especially by themedia but
also by some scholars. Yet, unlike other discursive practices, the
term neo-Ottomanism was not verbalized by the foreign policy
elites themselves but was simply implied through selective
remembering of the hybrid or multiethnic and multireligious
nature of the Ottoman Empire as “multicultural”.
Neither politics based on Turkey’s location nor critical analysis
of the construction of Turkey’s importance in terms of geography is
new. Bilgin’s (2007) paper provides an important critical engage-
ment with claims about Turkey’s “geopolitical importance.” Bilgin
illustrates that by upholding jeopolitik as a science, ﬁrst Turkey’s
military elite and then its civilian elite have only rationalized notonly foreign policymaking, but also certain types of domestic
decision making. In other words, Bilgin implicitly talks about
a geographical exceptionalism that infuses Turkish politics. This
paper, on the other hand, expands on Bilgin’s ﬁndings in three
ways. First, it argues that geographical exceptionalism does not
take place only by explicit references to jeopolitik. Analyzing the
discursive practices related to geography is anotherway to read and
reveal geographical exceptionalism. Second, this paper holds that it
is almost impossible to separate geographical from historical
imagination. It illustrates by analyzing the discursive practices that
construct a hybridized geography and history for Turkey, that
Turkish elites construct an exceptional identity for Turkey which
then helps them constitute liminal representations of the country.
Third, the paper, follows in the footsteps of Bhabha (who argued
that hybridity could only emerge in the state of liminality) in
elaborating on the sources and conditions of liminality, this time in
international relations.
Can exceptionalism be a viable political strategy? Benli Altunıs¸ık
argues that, ﬁrst Özal, and then Erdoganwere criticized for bringing
the Ottoman Empire and Islam back into the Turkish identity and
polity. This shift meant the reversal of Kemalist nation making,
which not only expelled the Ottoman Empire and Islam from
Turkish history, but preferred to direct its attention to the West, as
“Westernized” foreign policy was seen as part of the nation-
building effort (Benli Altunıs¸ık, 2009: p. 178). More importantly, an
exceptional identity based on the hybridization of Turkey’s geog-
raphy and history runs counter to the Kemalist nation-building
project on another count, because the Kemalist project was based
on the idea of “purity,” not hybridity (which signiﬁes impurity). In
this context, Turkish exceptionalism forms a layer of identity at the
international level that contradicts the identity at the domestic
level. Given this basis for Turkey’s national identity as well as
current practices regarding diversity and plurality in present-day
Turkey, Turkish exceptionalism is destined to remain yet another
paradox of Turkish polity.
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